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IN THE

COURT

OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate
of
JACK EDDY aka JACK P. EDDY,
aka JACK POLLARD EDDY,
Deceased.

.
Case No.
1
12165
\

JAMES H. EDDY FOR REHEARING
PETITION OF APPELLANT
Petitioner, appellant, James H. Eddy, respectfully
petitions the court for a rehearing of the above entitled
cause on the basis of the following points:
POINT I. IN REMANDING THE CASE TO THE
LOWER COURT FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO
THE INTENT OF THE TESTATOR WITH REGARD
TO THE DISPOSITION OF HIS PROPERTY UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DID EVENTUATE,
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING JAMES
EDDY FROM SUCH PROCEEDINGS.
POINT II. EXCLUSION OF JAMES EDDY
FROM THE PROCEEDINGS UPON REMAND IS A
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AS TO JAMES EDDY.
DATED this 20th day of March, 1972.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Albert J. Colton
Kent S. Lewis
Attorneys for Appellant,
James H. Eddy
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate

)

of
JACK EDDY aka JACK P. EDDY, )
aka JACK POLLARD EDDY,
Deceased.

Case No.

12165

BRIEF OF APPELLANT JAMES H. EDDY
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
INTRODUCTION
This court has remanded this case for further findings of fact by the trial court including a finding as ro
testator's intent "had his mind adverted to the particular
circumstance which did in fact eventuate: that is that
Roberta was no longer his wife, not by reason of her prior
death as he contemplated, but by reason of a divorce."
Yet this court has excluded James H. Eddy from participation in such proceedings, even though the trial court
can quite logically find as a fact any one of three alternatives: 1. that decedent intended Roberta to take; 2.
that decedent intended Sharon Hall to take; 3. that decedent intended neither of these to take.
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This court without any previous findings of fact on
this question by the trial court, is precluding the trier
of fact from one of the three possible alternatives, and is
precluding James H. Eddy from his day in court upon
a determination of facts.
Petitioner is aware that each member of this court
has given long and careful consideration to the terms of
the will and he does not seek by this petition to alter any
justice's particular opinion on the case based upon the
record before it. But if this court felt, as it did, that it
could not make a final determination without further
findings of fact, then petitioner strongly asserts that elementary due process should allow him to participate in
this fact finding process.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IN REMANDING THE CASE TO THE
LOWER COURT FOR FINDINGS OF FACT
AS TO THE INTENT OF THE TESTATOR
WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF
HIS PROPERTY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DID EVENTUATE, THE
COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING JAMES
EDDY FROM SUCH PROCEEDINGS.
The Court remanded the case for further findings of
fact because it found that there are insufficient facts from
which a determination could be made as to whom the
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testator intended to dispose his property but at the same
time the Court eliminated from the trial court's consideration upon remand the very real possibility that under
the unusual facts whoch were present the testator intended his property to go to James H. Eddy. The Court
by such a ruling has in essence instructed the trial court:
decide which party should receive the estate of the testator by determining to whom the testator intended to
dispose his property had his mind averted to the facts
which did eventuate, but do not decide in favor of James
Eddy if the facts show that the testator intended the
property to go to him. It is clear that under such a mandate the trial court would be severely limited from fully
exploring the issues remanded from this Court.
One of the issues the Court has remanded to the trial
court for further finding is what would have been the
testator's "intent had his mind averted to the particular
circumstance which did in fact eventuate: that Roberta
was no longer his wife by reason of her prior death as he
contemplated, but by reason of the divorce". This particular issue could not involve Roberta, the former wife,
for to reach it Roberta would already have to have been
eliminated from consideration, i.e., the waiver in the property settlement agreement must have been found to have
barred her claim under the will or the divorce must have
been found to have revoked the will. This conclusion
follows because all parties concede that if Roberta is not
precluded either by waiver or the decree itself, then she
would take. Thus, this portion of the court's mandate re-
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quires a determination as to whether the testator (1) intended Sharon Hall, the stepdaughter, to take even
though the specific condition of her talcing was not met
or (2) whether the testator intended under such circumstances the will would not dispose of his property.
It is clear that for any findings on the issue to be
complete and meaningful James Eddy would have to be
a party to the proceedings. The $1.00 clause alone should
not exclude James Eddy from the proceedings upon remand as it must be read in conjunction with the remaining paragraphs of the will, and, if the trial court is going
to look beyond the face of the documents to determine
the intent of the testator, there must be complete findings
of fact before any specific clause in the will could possibly
be held as conclusive against one of the parties.

POINT II.
EXCLUSION OF JAMES EDDY FROM THE
PROCEEDINGS UPON REMAND IS DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AS TO JAMES
EDDY.
Each justice on the Court who participated in the
decision wrote a separate opinion reaching a decision as
to which one of the three parties the estate should be
distributed, yet three of the justices remanded the case
for further proceedings between the stepdaughter, Sharon
Hall, and the former wife, Roberta Eddy. By remanding
the case for further proceedings between these two parties and excluding James Eddy from such proceedings
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after reaching a decision as to which party should take,
these justices have in effect voted for their top two
choices as to whom should take. Such a procedure could
clearly lead to absurd results as can be demonstrated by
assuming a fifth justice had participated in the proceedings and had concurred with Justice Ellett. In such case,
there would have been more justices in favor of James
Eddy taking than in favor of Roberta Eddy taking, but
James Eddy still would have been eliminated under this
procedure while Roberta Eddy would have remained in
the proceedings upon remand. James Eddy would submit
that a procedure where a party could lose a case by having more justices in favor of his position than in favor
of another party is fundamentally in error and submits
that the correct procedure in such a case where the Court
is divided is that all parties should be parties to the proceedings upon remand. The rule is stated as follows:

"When the judges are agreed on reversal, but are ,
equally divided as to what judgment or further
proceedings should be ordered, the cause will be
simply reversed and remanded for further proceedings generally leaving the lower court to take such
proceedings as it deems proper." 5 (B) C. J. S.,
Appe31 and Error, §1844, page 256.
In addi tion, if the case is to be decided on facts not
presently before the court the elimination of James Eddy
from the case prior to the determination of such facts is
a denial for James Eddy of his "day in court". James
Eddy should be allowed to have the opportunity to participate in the determination of the facts which will bind
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him as a party. As Sharon was not the decedent's own
daughter, decedent may have intended Sharon to take
only if Roberta was his wife at the time of her death. His
desire to leave his estate to Sharon may well have been
motivated solely by the fact that she was his wife's
daughter. The proceedings before the lower court may
well establish that this was indeed decedent's intent but
under the court's present holding the trial court could
not rule in favor of James Eddy. To prevent this possibility James Eddy submits that he should be allowed the
:nme right to establish his claim as the other two parties
a:e being given to establish their claims.
CONCLUSION
This matter contains several difficult issues which
have divided the Court as to which of the three parties
sbould prevail. The Court has indicated that the failure
of this Court to reach a decision may be because certain
critical factual issues were not submitted to the trial
court. Findings on these issues in the trial court could
make it clear that any one of the three claimants is entitled to the estate of the decedent, and, therefore, appellant, James Eddy urges the Court to reconsider its decision eliminating his claim from the case prior to findings
of fact on the issues the Court believes are necessary to
1·c:i ch a decision in this case.

Respectfully submitted,
F ABIA.."\; &

Albert J. Colton
Kent S. Lewis
A.ttomeys for Appell.ant,

James H. Eddy

800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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